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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to provide an overview of the 
Kierkegaardian approach to history; second, to define in more details some of the 
main characteristics of his concept of history. Throughout the paper, my overall 
aim will be to demonstrate that Kierkegaard, although he never provides a complete 
theory or philosophy of history, nevertheless presents us with a concept of the na-
ture of history. I refer to a ‘concept’ because I consider his thinking about history to 
constitute a coherent intellectual effort to describe and understand the nature of the 
historical. A concept is not a full-blown theory, but nor is it a mere rhapsody.
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Introduction
Kierkegaard wrote three texts under the same pseudonym, Johannes Cli-
macus: Johannes Climacus, (1841–2, hereafter JC), Philosophical Fragments 
(1844, hereafter PF) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments (1846, hereafter CUP) (Kierkegaard 1987). Without attempting 
to argue that the existence of a shared pseudonym is sufficient evidence for 
considering these texts to be proposing the same philosophical theory, I will 
claim that Kierkegaard’s understanding of ‘actuality’, ‘possibility’, ‘neces-
sity’, ‘knowledge of history’, ‘doubt’, ‘belief ’, and ‘passion’ remains constant 
through-out these three books. Thus, my argument presupposes the concep-
tual unity of these texts.
In PF, Kierkegaard’s primary interest is the problem of the Incarnation. 
On the face of it, therefore, the work may seem theological. My point of 
departure, however, is that through his struggle to theorise the Incarnation, 
Kierkegaard passes by way of history. Hence, in order to discuss the Incarna-
tion, Kierkegaard ends up exploring the very nature of history.
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The Aim of this Paper
In this paper, I will contend that: a) for Kierkegaard history is always the 
history of human beings; hence its nature is directly related to their freedom 
of will. In other words, human beings make history by using this freedom; 
and b) Kierkegaard considers historical fact as an uncertain object of cogni-
tion. To put it bluntly, we cannot achieve the same scientific accuracy in our 
knowledge of history as we do in the natural sciences.
Therefore, in what follows I focus on the answers that Kierkegaard gives: 
a) to the ontological question ‘What is the nature of history?’ and b) to the 
epistemological question ‘Which is the nature of our historical knowledge?’. 
I will argue that these questions cannot be separated from each other, accord-
ing to Kierkegaard: ontology and epistemology are intertwined. In fact, Ki-
erkegaard argues that for his epistemological thesis that historical knowledge 
cannot be of the same precision as knowledge of the laws of nature, precisely 
because of an ontological thesis that there is no necessity in history, hence no 
general and necessary laws.1
In order to demonstrate the above interconnections between the onto-
logical and the epistemological in Kierkegaard’s concept of history, I pursue 
an extended and detailed analysis of ‘The Interlude’ in PF. I do so because, 
in many ways the Interlude provides the very core of Kierkegaard’s concept 
of history.
The Interlude
Robert C. Roberts takes ‘the Interlude’ to be ‘a defense of a thesis concern-
ing historical beliefs in general’ (1986: 99). Jacob Howland argues that 
‘[C]limacus’s general aim is clear: he wants to safeguard faith from the tyr-
anny of philosophical reason…[H]e hopes to refute the doctrine that history 
is the unfolding of necessity…’ (2006: 158). Peter Fenves claims that Clima-
cus here argues against any kind of secure historical knowledge because ‘such 
a [temporal] moment discloses only the constant annihilation of possibility 
in actuality…’ (1993: 132).
What all these commentators share, despite all their ultimately divergent 
interpretations, is the contention that ‘the Interlude’ contains Kierkegaard’s 
concept of history in nuce.
However, this is where agreement ends, for each of these commentators 
diverge considerably both in what they understand Kierkegaard’s concept of 
1 Kierkegaard’s ‘necessity’ is logical necessity and not causal necessity. For Kierkegaard 
however, the lack of logical necessity within history renders problematic any application of 
necessary historical laws that could help us make a historical ‘prognosis’. 
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history to be and in their evaluation of how cogent Kierkegaard’s argument 
is. Hence, Roberts and Fenves argue that Kierkegaard in ‘the Interlude’ tries 
to answer the epistemological question of the nature of the historical knowl-
edge. For example, Roberts holds that: ‘[T]he Interlude is organized as a 
refutation of two theses: First, that the truths of history are necessary truths; 
and second that they are knowable by the direct deliverances of the senses’ 
(1986: 101). Similarly, Peter Fenves understands ‘the Interlude’ as an argu-
ment against historical knowledge and he argues that for Climacus:
…[I]t no longer makes sense to assert that one can recognise a temporal mo-
ment and thus gain historical knowledge…So faith is a form of knowledge; it 
both provides a criterion for unification and refuses the principal criterion of all 
thought. (1993: 132)
On the other hand, Mercer focuses on the ontological questions the 
Interlude raises. He argues that the ‘Interlude’ is ‘related to the structures of 
the self and its relation to time…The problem of necessity is discussed, but 
in relation to the problem that necessity creates for human freedom, history, 
and existence’ (2000: 119).
Finally, there are a number of scholars who treat the Interlude merely as 
a polemic against Hegel. It is here, they argue, Kierkegaard reveals himself 
in direct opposition to Hegel (or to Martensen). For example Niels Thul-
strup argues that within the Interlude Kierkegaard is able to demonstrate the 
differences between his own ‘conceptual clarification of history’ and Hegel’s 
philosophy of history. The main difference here, moreover, concerns the role 
that necessity plays in history. Hegel finds necessity within history while Ki-
erkegaard is excluding necessity from history (1980: 362–364).
Jon Stewart similarly conceives the Interlude in terms of Kierkegaard’s 
relationship with Hegelian thinkers. He argues that ‘Climacus uses the ar-
gument about the categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity as the 
preliminary analysis for his account of history, which now follows in “the 
Interlude”’ (2003: 359). And what is crucial is that this account of history 
was a polemic aimed at Martensen, specifically his “Lectures on the History 
of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel” delivered in the Winter Semester 
1838–1839.2
In what follows, I argue that all the above interpretations are incomplete. 
Rather, in the Interlude Kierkegaard attempts to answer both the ontological 
and the epistemological question simultaneously. Indeed, furthermore, even 
if Kierkegaard did intend to polemicise against a specific philosopher, in so 
doing he generates his own authentic concept of history; hence, what is at 
2 Stewart (2003: 374). Both Thulstrup and Stewart consider the ‘Interlude’ as revelatory 
of Kierkegaard’s thinking on history.
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stake in the Interlude is not the question of whom it is directed against but 
rather the question of what Kierkegaard’s arguments are.
Kierkegaard himself underlines the importance of the ‘Interlude’:
If a speculative thinker were to say that he comprehended the necessity of a his-
torical phenomenon, I would indeed bid him to occupy himself for a moment 
with the misgivings set forth in all simplicity in the Interlude between chapters 
IV and V of Fragments. (1992: Vol. I, 53–54)
While the question about who Kierkegaard considers to be a ‘specula-
tive thinker’ is one which continually rages in the critical literature, for my 
purposes the crucial point is that Kierkegaard intends the Interlude as an 
argument about the nature of a historical phenomenon.
PF itself begins with these three questions regarding the nature of ‘his-
tory’. And yet Climacus says nothing about history in the first few chapters 
of the book. It is only when the reader reaches the Interlude that one finds 
Climacus discussing issues closely related to historical phenomena.
What becomes apparent to the reader at this point is the focus of the 
Interlude on temporality (past and future) and the relation of necessity to 
this temporality (along with the latter’s relation to the other modalities). His-
tory concerns the past and any historical fact is by its nature something that 
is temporal. Hence, it becomes even clearer that the Interlude is essentially 
concerned with history, when one reads its subtitles:
a) ‘Coming into existence’
b) ‘The historical’
c) ‘The past’
I will examine each of these in turn in what follows.
Coming into existence
Before we proceed to an analysis of Climacus’ arguments, we must clarify one 
central issue, namely the meaning of ‘existence’. The Hongs write that ‘“Ex-
istence,” “exist,” pertain to temporal and spatial being or actuality’ (PF, 297). 
Climacus explains his own view of the meaning of ‘existence’ in the third 
chapter of PF, ‘The Absolute Paradox’. Here, Climacus defines ‘existence’ in 
a long note, arguing against Spinoza’s theory of ‘existence’:
Consequently, [for Spinoza], the more perfect, the more being; the more being, 
the more perfect. This, however, is a tautology…Consequently, the more per-
fect the thing is, the more it is; but its perfection is that it has more esse in itself, 
which means that the more it is, the more it is…He [Spinoza] explains perfectio 
by realitas, esse [he explains perfection by reality, being]…But to go on, what is 
lacking here is a distinction between factual being and ideal being… (PF, 41)
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This argument is well-known as a proof of God’s existence: God is the 
most perfect being; the most perfect being incorporates existence; therefore 
God exists. Yet, in opposition to this, Climacus identifies a radical differ-
ence between ‘factual being’ and ‘ideal being’. Climacus dissociates essence 
from existence. Hence, Climacus separates the ideas we have of objects (any 
kind of object, even God) and the actuality of the existence of these objects. 
Theologically, what is at issue here is the possibility of a logical explanation 
of the Incarnation, and it is for this reason he concludes this note: ‘…for the 
difficulty is to grasp factual being and bring God’s ideality into factual being’ 
(PF, 42).
It seems that Climacus considers existence to be completely different 
from ideality. Ronald M. Green argues that Climacus here relies heavily on 
Kant’s arguments against the ontological proof of the existence of God (1992: 
122–123). The most important issue here, however, is Climacus’ account of 
existence. Existence is not simply an attribute of essence. Existence is ‘factual 
being’. The simplest way to understand ‘existence’ is to relate it to spatio-
temporal ‘facts’. ‘Factual being’ is not an essence but a given fact within the 
spatio-temporal conditions of our universe.3
With this conceptual clarification in mind, the first question that Clima-
cus asks in the Interlude runs:
How is that changed which comes into existence [blive til], or what is the change 
(κίνησις) of coming into existence [Tilbivelse]? All other change (ἀλλοίωσις) 
presupposes the existence of that in which change is taking place, even though 
the change is that of ceasing to be in existence [at voere til]. (PF, 73)
Every change that occurs in an entity that exists, presupposes that some-
thing in that entity remains the same, ensuring an identity before, at the 
time of and after the occurrence of change. If the change is a change in space 
(motion or κίνησις), then, what remains the same through this movement 
is the entity’s body. If the change is a change in the body of an existing thing 
(ἀλλοίωσις), then what remains the same through this change is the iden-
tity of the thing. When people get older, their body changes but their identity 
remains the same.
When something comes into existence, what exactly is the change that 
occurs to that thing? In other words, when something comes into our world, 
can we talk of a change, and if yes, what exactly is that change? Kierkegaard is 
3 Kierkegaard’s ‘factuality’ of existence refers specifically to its actualization within space 
and time. Historical occurrence is always something that occurs as an actuality. Kierkegaard’s 
‘factuality’ is identical to this ‘actuality’. The Kierkegaardian ‘given fact’ refers only to its com-
plete actualization within temporality and bears no relation to the possibility of being cog-
nized.
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here tapping into a whole philosophical tradition which struggles to theorise 
such change adequately. This is because in order for a thing to change while 
entering our world, something must remain the same and so ensure an iden-
tity before, during and after the entrance of that thing into existence.4
If, in coming into existence, a plan is intrinsically changed, then it is not 
this plan that comes into existence; but if it comes into existence unchanged, 
what, then, is the change of coming into existence? (PF, 73)
Climacus argues that the only change we can identify in a thing that 
comes into existence ‘is not in [its] essence but in [its] being’ and more spe-
cifically ‘from not existing to existing’ (PF, 73). In this way when something 
new comes into existence, what really happens is a change in its being; before 
the change its being was ‘not-being’ and after the change it consisted in a 
‘positive’ being. Having said that, Climacus argues, can we talk of the same 
thing before and after its coming into existence? In response, he argues that 
only in the case of possibility and its actualisation can we legitimately speak 
of the same thing passing through the change of ‘coming into existence’. To 
understand this, however, we must proceed further with his argument.
Climacus’s next step is to identify ‘not-being’ with possibility and ‘being’ 
with actuality:
But such a being that nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, and a being 
that is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and the change of coming into 
existence is the transition from possibility to actuality. (PF, 74)
On the basis of such identification Climacus goes on to pinpoint the es-
sential difference between ideal being and factual being. Only the latter exists 
in our spatio-temporal world and participates in actuality. Immediately, one 
must consider a possible objection to Climacus’ thesis: the only thing that 
seems to remain the same when a possibility is actualised is its essence or its 
ideality. For what underlies the transition from non-being to existence, is the 
very ‘idea’ of that being. Climacus however, has already refuted the existence 
of the ‘ideal’. Furthermore, he now reinforces this refutation by stating that: 
‘[T]he necessary is always related to itself and is related to itself in the same 
way, [thus] it cannot be changed at all’ (PF, 74). His argument is clear: if the 
necessary cannot change at all, then the necessary cannot come into exist-
ence, because every coming into existence is a change.
In consequence, the following picture emerges: Climacus ascribes ne-
cessity to the ideal and distinguishes both of them from ‘existence’. What 
remains to be understood, however, is the absolute opposition that Climacus 
goes on to infer between existence and necessity, ideal and historical occur-
rence.
4 Kierkegaard’s analysis here is essentially Aristotelian. See Gonzalez (2007: 313).
91G. PATIOS: Kierkegaard’s Concept of History
Mercer interprets Kierkegaard’s absolute opposition between necessity 
and existence, as a logical conclusion. He argues that if the necessary is an 
actuality, then the necessary must first becomes possible. If however, the nec-
essary is possible, then ‘one could conclude that the necessary is also not pos-
sible’ (2000: 122). Hence, necessity is not an actuality.
I argue that to interpret Kierkegaard’s absolute dissociation of necessity 
and actuality in this way may provide the basis of his argument, but ulti-
mately it does not fully capture Kierkegaard’s point regarding history and ne-
cessity. Kierkegaard is providing more than a logical analysis. As we shall see, 
Kierkegaard argues that doubt is not a matter of a possible lack of knowledge 
but a matter of will. In this way, Kierkegaard argues that we cannot aspire 
to overcome doubt with the acquisition of more knowledge. To overcome 
doubt is not a matter of knowing ‘historical’ necessities. To overcome doubt 
is purely a matter of (free) will. Kierkegaard thus does not remain at the level 
of a purely logical analysis of the paradox of a possible necessity. Rather, his 
argument aims to make apparent the need (regarding historical existence) for 
a shift from epistemology to moral decisions. If we want to rule out doubt 
from history we do not need knowledge but will. We fail to fully understand 
this if we believe that Kierkegaard wants to make a logical analysis.
Necessity/Freedom
In order, for us, to fully capture the way Kierkegaard understands the nature 
and the role of freedom in history we must closely examine and analyse his 
overall argument about necessity and freedom in history (coming into exist-
ence).
Climacus’ next step in the Interlude is to claim that if necessity cannot 
be a part of any ‘coming into existence’, then ‘All coming into existence oc-
curs in freedom…Every cause ends in a freely acting cause’ (PF, 75). At stake 
in this claim are the following presuppositions:
a) Necessity and existence are incompatible spheres.
b) Everything that comes into existence, (thus into actuality), has a free 
cause.
c) Even if we can detect natural laws in actuality and hence some kind 
of ‘necessity’, this does not refute the above, for if we were to follow 
events back to the beginning of the causal chain, we could discover 
freely acting causes alone.
For Climacus, as we have seen, there are only two possible ways of ‘be-
ing’: either as the ‘ideal’ and therefore as necessary or as the factual in which 
there resides no necessity. The crucial inference which Climacus now makes 
on the basis of this already established dichotomy is that a complete lack of 
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necessity indicates freedom. So, although Climacus does not here provide us 
an elaborate definition of either necessity or freedom, he does indicate the 
relation that exists between them – one of mutual exclusion: either freedom 
is posited or necessity, but never both. Therefore, it becomes evident that 
Climacus directly opposes any kind of mediation between necessity and free-
dom.
Kierkegaard (through Climacus) is so absolute about the incompatibility 
of necessity and freedom within history that for him even the so-called neces-
sary laws of nature do not demonstrate the presence of necessity in actuality. 
What is Climacus’ reasoning for this contention? It runs as follows: when we 
discover causes (natural laws) that seem to necessarily produce certain effects, 
regression down the causal chain to the first cause will always return us to a 
freely acting cause. Thus Climacus writes:
The intervening causes are misleading in that the coming into existence appears 
to be necessary; the truth about them is that they, as having themselves come 
into existence, definitively point back to a freely acting cause. As soon as com-
ing into existence is definitively reflected upon, even an inference from natural 
law is not evidence of the necessity of any coming into existence. (PF, 75)
Climacus’ argument can be reconstructed as follows:
a) Any ‘coming into existence’ has to undergo a change.
b) Necessity prohibits any kind of change.
c) Thus, no ‘fact’ can occur necessarily.
d) When we come across certain natural laws that imply that certain 
facts occur in a necessary way, returning to the first cause in the 
causal chain will always demonstrate the occurrence of this ‘coming 
into existence’.
e) Thus, even strict causal chains necessarily have a free beginning.
The nature of necessity is still to be determined. It might be argued on 
this basis that causal necessity can coexist with history and with historical 
contingency. If, however, this is the case, it is difficult to conceive Kierke-
gaard’s absolute separation of them. The answer, I argue, is simple: Kierke-
gaard’s specific conception of ‘necessity’ here is a form of logical necessity. 
This is apparent because of Climacus’ acceptance of the existence of natural 
laws and the existence of causal necessity. I would contend, therefore, that 
his argument proceeds as follows: whenever we wish to fully know historical 
existence by means of causal necessity, this involves the application of logical 
analysis. This logical analysis, however, is incompatible with the very nature 
of historical existence. I return to this issue at length in what follows.
Climacus thus, creates an insurmountable hiatus between ‘necessary’ 
and ‘existing’ being. For Climacus freedom can only be where necessity can-
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not be. A radical dualism is in play. Although Climacus has yet to define these 
concepts, their meaning does become determinate by means of their mutual 
opposition.
Roberts interprets Climacus’ argument in the following way:
Even if we can explain the actualization of possibility a by reference to the 
actualizations of other possibilities (which are the causal antecedents for a) still 
this string of possibilities is only one among an indefinitely large set of strings. 
(1986: 106)
Roberts thus emphasises the contingency of the first cause in any causal 
chain as the crucial argument Kierkegaard uses to demonstrate the lack of 
necessity within historical existence.
Kierkegaard indeed makes this point but only to underline the contrast 
between absolute causality and historical existence. As we shall see, by ‘his-
torical existence’ he means specifically human historical existence. Roberts’ 
point is useful for the examination of causality in nature but not enough to 
successfully reconstruct Kierkegaard’s analysis of ‘historical existence’.
The Historical
As we have already established, one primary characteristic of history is that it 
‘has come into existence’ and thus we have to attribute to it freedom and lack 
of necessity. Another primary characteristic is that history refers only to hu-
man history and not to nature’s history. Nature does exist, but has no memory 
of its existence; and although nature has a past, a present and a future, nature 
cannot be ‘free’ because nature cannot be aware of its past in a way that could 
enable it to decide about its present and its future. It is in this vein that Clima-
cus speaks of a ‘redoubling’ of human being’s ‘coming into existence’:
Yet coming into existence can contain within itself a redoubling, that is, a pos-
sibility of a coming into existence within its own coming into existence. Here, 
in the stricter sense, is the historical, which is dialectical with respect to time. 
(PF, 76)
I am arguing that Kierkegaard is here clear that ‘history’ refers solely to 
human history. Only human beings have the capacity to relate themselves to 
their past in a way that makes them capable of freely choosing their future.5
Mackey nicely sums up this direct connection between freedom and his-
tory:
5 In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard expresses the idea that the self is a relation that 
relates itself to itself. Nature does not have this relation, and consequently it does not have the 
‘redoubling’ that constitutes historical (human) existence. 
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The eternal, which is also the necessary, has no history in any sense. It sustains 
no relationship to possibility, actuality, change, or freedom. Nature is pure syn-
chrony (spatiality), save for the fact that it has, as a whole, come into being. 
History is pure diachrony (temporality), save for the fact that it presupposes 
space as its locus…Strictly speaking, nothing happens in nature. It is always, 
if cyclically, the same, for which reason there are laws of nature. But historical 
events, for which there are no laws, are the operations of freely working causes 
terminating in the working of an absolute free cause. (1986: 127)
While I agree with Mackey’s stress on the absence of necessary laws in 
historical events, it strikes me that Mackey fails to take his conclusion far 
enough, so as to draw out the philosophical implications of Kierkegaard’s 
approach to history. As I have already argued, what previous commentators 
of the Interlude have failed to discern is that Kierkegaard is attempting to 
answer both the ontological question and the epistemological question about 
history therein.
In order to defend properly my above mentioned claim I will schema-
tise the way in which Climacus answers both of these questions. In regard 
to the ontological question about the nature of history Climacus argues: a) 
history is always human history and b) freedom reigns within it, (the kind of 
freedom that excludes any kind of necessity). In terms of the epistemological 
question, there is still much to determine; however, preliminarily one can 
conclude that the knowledge we have of nature by means of natural laws is 
unavailable for historical cognition.
However, before proceeding further with the epistemological question, 
we need to emphasise once more the fact that Climacus states that history, 
human beings and freedom constitute a fully unified nexus. Furthermore, 
this implies that such a direct connection between the ‘historical’ and ‘free-
dom’ leaves human beings as the sole historical agents. Human beings alone 
make history through their own free choices. Past and present are human 
actualities while human future is human possibility. And so to redefine the 
present in the light of the past and the future is the distinguishing mark of a 
properly human freedom.
Howland makes a similar point in regard to Climacus’ argument in the 
Interlude: ‘[O]nly human beings are self-consciously historical, continually 
redefining themselves in terms of their actual pasts and possible futures. And 
this “dialectical” process of redefinition, or of mediating the present in the 
light of actual pasts and possible futures, is a sign of human freedom’ (2006: 
161).
However, missing from Howland’s account are the following elements: 
a) human freedom is mainly oriented towards future decisions and b) human 
freedom is a matter of human will (and so of human ability to make deci-
sions). What is more, what Howland fails to see, is that this freedom is always 
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accompanied by an acceptance (from the side of the people who freely make 
these decisions) of human responsibility.
The Past
It has been already argued that for Kierkegaard necessity cannot be found 
within history. In what follows, I will give further details on how Kierke-
gaard defends the absolute lack of necessity in history. To be more specific, 
I will analyse how Climacus argues against the notion that the past can be 
necessary. By doing so, I intend to further exhibit Kierkegaard’s rejection of 
necessity in history.
Usually, when we think of history we think of the past. In fact, the 
customary and perhaps most trivial definition of history is the ‘past’ of some-
thing, or something that happened in the past. Yet, as we have seen, for 
Climacus, although nature has a past, it cannot really have a history. Only 
human beings have history, because only human beings can understand what 
it means to have a past, a present and a future. Moreover, Climacus argues 
at the same time that necessity cannot be found within history. One possible 
objection to this latter point runs as follows: the past is necessary because the 
past cannot be changed:
What has happened has happened and cannot be undone; thus it cannot be 
changed. Is this unchangeableness the unchangeableness of necessity?… What 
has happened has happened the way it happened; thus it is unchangeable. But is 
this unchangeableness the unchangeableness of necessity? (PF, 76–77)
Climacus’ response is, once more, simple: every past, before becoming 
a past was a present; this present became present through ‘coming into exist-
ence’. And, as we know, the present comes into existence freely. Although we 
cannot undo or change the past, we can think of this past as different: it could 
have been other than it is, i.e. the past is contingent.
Here we have one more indication of the nature of Kierkegaardian 
necessity: it is logical necessity. Contingency allows room for causal neces-
sity (under specific conditions). As previously noted, this logical necessity 
has certain philosophical implications regarding the ability to fully know 
historical facts. We cannot expect ourselves to be able to fully know and 
understand history by applying logical analysis to historical facts. The exist-
ence of causal necessity applies merely to nature and not to human history. 
Moreover, logical analysis is totally incompatible with (human) historical 
existence. In this way Kierkegaard does not depend on contingency to ex-
clude necessity. Kierkegaard renders history a field of actualisation, instead 
of a field of cognition.
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For example, we cannot change how World War II ended; this, however, 
does not mean that this past could not have developed in the opposite direc-
tion. Mercer is thus right to underline that:
The past is the result of the choice or choices made among the possibilities of 
the future in the present and those possibilities are different and varied. It does 
not follow that one particular choice result in a particular past… If the past and 
the future are necessary then they are neither past nor future, but simply are. 
(2000: 127–128)
The concept of history involves continuous change, and consequently 
involves freedom to so change. Mercer’s analysis, however, still fails to ac-
knowledge that Kierkegaard’s analysis is not focused on the effort to under-
stand how past history ‘results’ in present and future history. On the contrary, 
Kierkegaard argues in favour of the actual existence (and thus historical exist-
ence) of (human) freedom of will and (human) freedom of choice.
As Climacus spells out, there exists a continuous interaction between our 
past, present and future. We understand ourselves and our reality through 
the continuous effort to choose between different possible choices. Hence, 
Climacus points out that, if it is asserted that we lack the freedom to make 
choices, so that we are simply subjected to necessity, then we end up living in 
a permanent present, instead of willing history. In fact, as we have seen, Ki-
erkegaard has already made clear that ‘necessity always relates itself to itself at 
the same way’ (PF, 74). It follows therefore that, necessity is eternally and so 
cannot become ‘history’. What is absolutely crucial here is that Kierkegaard 
focuses on the capacity of human beings to will and so choose to make his-
tory, rather than focusing on the ability of human beings to know history.
Furthermore, Climacus goes on to provide another reason to avoid at-
tributing necessity to the past. He claims that if we consider the past neces-
sary, we must attribute such necessity to the future as well, because:
If the past had become necessary, the opposite conclusion could not be drawn 
with respect to the future, but on the contrary it would follow that the future 
would also be necessary. If necessity could supervene at one single point, then 
we could no longer speak of the past and the future. To want to predict the 
future (prophecy) and to want to understand the necessity of the past are al-
together identical, and only the prevailing fashion makes the one seem more 
plausible than the other to a particular generation. (PF, 77)
In order to understand Climacus’ argument here, one needs to keep in 
mind that for him ‘necessity is and it always is in the same way’. If we accept 
that the past is necessary, then, one must also accept that the future, which 
has already been transformed into the past, was also necessary. That is, each 
past moment is previously a present moment and, before that, a future mo-
ment.
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By arguing the above, Climacus intends to indicate that, if we accept 
that our past is necessary, then the future and the present of that past must 
also be necessary. Such is the reason behind his claim that ‘prophecy’ and un-
derstanding the past as necessary ‘are altogether identical’. We can predict the 
future only if it occurs in a necessary way (i.e. according to necessary laws). 
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, Climacus employs the same line of 
reasoning on the past: we cannot understand the past as necessary, for the 
past is merely one out of many equally possible pasts that could occur.
Therefore, we are now able to take a step back to reflect on Climacus’ 
argument so far. This argument, we have seen, constitutes an answer to the 
ontological question of history: the nature of history is to be conceived exclu-
sively as the history of human beings and so must be directly connected with 
‘freedom’. Provisional conclusions are also possible concerning the epistemo-
logical question of history: one cannot apply ‘scientific’ methods to history in 
order to know it in the same way as one applies them in the field of nature. 
We cannot aspire to find necessary laws in history.
This is also the reason why Climacus goes on to argue that knowledge of 
the past does not confer necessity upon it:
The past is not necessary, inasmuch as it came into existence; it did not become 
necessary by coming into existence (a contradiction), and it becomes even less 
necessary through any apprehension of it… If the past were to become nec-
essary through the apprehension [of it], then the past would gain what the 
apprehension lost, since it would apprehend something else, which is poor ap-
prehension. If what is apprehended is changed in the apprehension, then the 
apprehension is changed into a misunderstanding… [K]knowledge of the past 
does not confer necessity upon it–for all apprehension, like all knowing, has 
nothing from which to give. (PF, 79–80)
Climacus’ argument can be reconstructed as follows:
a) While the past certainly existed, it is not necessary.
b) Our apprehension of the past cannot make it necessary.6
c) If, through apprehension, one could make it necessary, then either 
one would apprehend the past in the wrong way, (because the past is 
not necessary), or such apprehension would have the power to change 
the essence of the past, which – for Climacus – is absurd.7
Hence, Climacus here turns far more explicitly to the epistemological 
question of history and so the question of the knowledge we are able to have 
of history: no logical necessity is either discernible in history or can be attrib-
6 Kant obviously disagrees with this philosophical claim. Such a disagreement cannot, 
however, be further pursued in this analysis.
7 Again, this is not absurd for a transcendental idealist. 
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uted to it by means of cognition. While one can be sure, for example, about 
simple facts (the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, for example), 
one cannot fully apprehend how exactly it happened that this outcome oc-
curred rather than any other.
Such an example demonstrates why for Climacus it is so important to 
directly connect the ontological issue of the nature of history to the epistemo-
logical issue of the knowledge of history. Freedom (which is defined as lack 
of necessity), on the one hand, characterises the nature of history, but, on the 
other hand, excludes any scientifically accurate historical knowledge. Causal 
necessity applies only to nature, so human history cannot be totally analysed 
by means of causal thinking.
That is, what emerges in the Interlude is a demand to approach the 
whole field of philosophy of history from another perspective. A demand 
emerges to treat history differently. Such an alternative conception of history 
would ensure that historical knowledge remains open to doubt and alterna-
tive forms of apprehension. And such an alternative conception of history 
is only made possible for Climacus by means of the central contention that 
‘history’ is par excellence the field of freedom and so a realm in which human 
beings cannot be totally secure about their knowledge. When Climacus ex-
cludes necessity from history, this brings about a complete paradigm shift in 
the philosophy of history, starting with the ineluctable ‘uncertainty’ of our 
historical knowledge.
Moreover, the significance of such a shift is precisely what I have argued is 
neglected by all the above mentioned commentators. That is, they fail to take 
seriously the fact that for Climacus the problem of ‘freedom’ applies equally 
on an ontological and epistemological level historically. At the very moment 
that Climacus removes any necessity from history, he generates uncertainty in 
historical cognition. As scholars, we therefore cannot analyse his argument in 
the Interlude from either merely the ontological level of the nature of history 
or merely from the epistemological level of historical knowledge. To do so 
would radically distort Climacus’ newly-won perspective.
The context to the Interlude
The conclusions Climacus reaches in the Interlude need to be placed in a 
broader context, for their purpose can only become fully clear if we con-
sider their role in PF as a whole. The question that orients PF is the extent 
to which one is able to come theoretically to terms with the Incarnation 
of Jesus Christ. Climacus answers this question first by considering logical 
and scientific methods as a possible means of understanding the Incarnation, 
but, unsurprisingly, in the course of his argument, this approach is rejected 
wholesale. The Interlude in particular contributes two significant claims 
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to this overall argument: a) historical facts, like the Incarnation, cannot be 
known beyond any possible doubt and b) doubt is not overruled by further 
knowledge but by an act of will.
We have already thoroughly examined Climacus’ argument concerning 
historical facts and the nature of their knowledge. Before I proceed on analys-
ing the way Climacus approaches doubt, it would be beneficial to my analysis 
to offer the general context of the Interlude.
The reason, that makes me to refer to the context of the Interlude after 
the Interlude and not before it, is that ‘context’ here can be defined as a fur-
ther conceptual justification of the statements we examined in the Interlude. 
That is, we need first to know what is argued in the Interlude, because we, in 
a way, need to start with the ‘facts’. Here, as ‘facts’ we take the Kierkegaardian 
statements concerning history and the historical.
This section also is a useful introduction to the way Climacus argues 
about doubt, belief and freedom in the last section of the Interlude. It is so, 
because the problem of the exact nature of belief and doubt concerned Cli-
macus through his three texts JC, PF and CUP and not only in the Interlude. 
Hence, examining the way Climacus approaches the problem of belief and 
doubt in JC, PF and CUP can help us understand better his argument in 
the Interlude. Climacus’ general view of the nature of freedom in these three 
texts can introduce us to the way he approaches freedom in the last part of 
the Interlude. It will become easier for us to fully grasp his final approach 
to freedom if we, first, examine the way freedom is approached through the 
whole oeuvre of Climacus.
Climacus’ argument in the Interlude over the nature of history and the 
nature of our historical knowledge is part of a more general attack aimed at 
those who argue that we can overcome our doubts about the Incarnation 
through historical knowledge or through scientific methods.8 It is in this vein 
that in CUP Climacus returns to a passage from PF:
As is well known, Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that despite 
the historical–indeed, precisely by means of the historical–has wanted to be the 
single individual’s point of departure for this eternal consciousness, has wanted 
to interest him otherwise than merely historically, has wanted to base his happi-
ness on his relation to something historical. (CUP, 15)
The problem with a philosophical approach to the Incarnation is central 
to Kierkegaard’s thought even prior to PF and CUP: ‘[C]hristianity’s claim 
that it had come into the world by a beginning that was simultaneously his-
torical and eternal had caused philosophy much difficulty’ (JC, 134–135). 
8 For a thorough examination of the disputes in Denmark in Kierkegaard’s time about 
the correct philosophical interpretations of the Incarnation, see Stewart (2003: 336–377).
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In each of these three texts, the same pseudonym, Climacus, is employed, 
and this suggests to me that it is through this pseudonym of Climacus that 
Kierkegaard most fully explicates his position concerning the knowability of 
the Incarnation.
Hence, the arguments in the Interlude to a large extent rest on and con-
tribute to this broader context of Climacus’ writings as a whole.
At the heart of Climacus’ analysis in each of these three texts lies the 
problem ‘of the confusion of historical and eternal categories’ (i.e. freedom 
and necessity), the problem of the definition of actuality and the definition of 
doubt. We have already followed the fate of the first two problems in the In-
terlude. Before I turn to the third one it would be beneficiary for my analysis 
to consider their role more generally in Climacus’ oeuvre.9
In JC, for example, the problem of necessity is articulated as follows:
Philosophy, however, wanted to do something even more difficult: it wanted 
to permeate everything with the thought of eternity and necessity, wanted to 
do this in the present moment, which would mean slaying the present with the 
thought of eternity and yet preserving its fresh life. (JC, 142–143)
Having stated the problem thus, Climacus continues to explore the pos-
sibility of a relation between necessity and actuality. This is a question to 
which he will answer negatively in the Interlude. Indeed, in CUP Climacus 
underscores this position:
Placing necessity together with the interpretation of world history, as has been 
done by modern speculative thought, has only caused great confusion, whereby 
possibility, actuality, and necessity are confused. (CUP, 343)
The nature of doubt and belief and their role regarding the problem of 
the historical knowledge finds, for Climacus, its final solution in the last sec-
tion of the Interlude. In the second part of JC, however, Climacus gives us 
his first attempt to define them. One of the ways it is possible to discern that 
Climacus’ definitive answer is in the Interlude is that Kierkegaard makes a 
very similar point (to the one he makes in the Interlude) in his Journals:
It is claimed that arguments against Christianity arise out of doubt. This is a 
total misunderstanding. The arguments against Christianity arise out of insub-
ordination, reluctance to obey, mutiny against all authority. Therefore, until 
now the battle against objections has been shadowboxing, because it has been 
9 I cannot argue that the existence of the same pseudonym (Climacus) as the author in 
JC, PF and CUP proves their intellectual and conceptual proximity. I will not claim that the 
texts mentioned above are totally and directly connected to each other. These three books how-
ever constitute the necessary general context for the complete understanding of the Interlude. 
For the problem of Kierkegaard’s pseudonimity see the introduction of Giles (2000: 3–10).
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intellectual combat with doubt instead of being ethical combat against mutiny. 
(Kierkegaard 1970: Vol. I, 778 (Pap. VIII A 7))
Apparent in both PF and the Journals is Kierkegaard’s insistence that 
knowledge is not appropriate means to battle against doubt. On this issue, 
Climacus represents Kierkegaard’s view. The broader context makes this even 
more apparent. Already in JC one can detect a shift from an epistemological 
view of our existence to an ethical one. Faith, rather than knowledge, is able 
to counter doubt. Such a development continues throughout PF and CUP. 
In the latter text Climacus points out that ethical knowledge is prior to any 
other knowledge.10 To acquire ethical knowledge however, means to be able 
to decide about our lives. It is a matter of will. Kierkegaard, or Climacus, 
always defines actuality in terms of making decisions and thus, for him: ‘The 
individual’s own ethical actuality is the only actuality’ (CUP, 327).
Unsurprisingly given these points of convergence, all three texts are in 
agreement on the nature of historical cognition. As we have seen in the In-
terlude, knowledge of the historical cannot aspire to being ‘absolute’ or com-
plete; there will always be a ‘gap’ in our knowledge constituted by the very 
moment of ‘coming into existence’. Objective scientific laws have no applica-
tion in the field of history. Similar views are promulgated in CUP and JC, as 
we shall now see.
Indeed, it is in JC that Climacus first notices the ‘inappropriate’ confu-
sion of necessity and history which will be so important for the argument of 
the Interlude:
…[I]t seemed strange to him that people talked so imprecisely, that they con-
fused historical and eternal categories in such a way that when they seemed to 
be saying something historical they were saying something eternal. (JC, 134)
Historical knowledge is but a relative knowledge and as such cannot act 
as a remedy to our doubts. In JC, Climacus specifically refers to the problem 
of ‘objective thinking’ in relation to the problem of doubt in general: ‘Thus it 
would be a misunderstanding for someone to think that doubt can be over-
come by so-called objective thinking’ (JC, 170). Without delving into the 
problem of what exactly Kierkegaard means by the term ‘objective thinking’ 
in any detail, it is surely correct to note that it includes some reference to ob-
jective scientific methods.11 In the Interlude, as we have seen, Climacus will 
argue that such ‘objective thinking’ is not applicable in the field of history.
10 See for example Kierkegaard, CUP, 317, where Climacus refers to Socrates.
11 In CUP Climacus refers to ‘objective thinking’ in terms of a thinking that can be ac-
quired through objective means and so is more ‘credible’ than ‘subjective thinking’. Of course 
Climacus’ arguments in CUP are ultimately intended to invert this relation: it is subjective 
thinking that it is more ‘reliable’ than objective thinking. What it is important here for my 
analysis is to underline the fact that objective thinking includes scientific methods.
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Climacus’ argument concerning the lack of necessity in history and the 
freedom that pertains in actuality is not restricted only at the Interlude. In-
stead, it is explored also in JC and CUP. Climacus in the last section of the 
Interlude will further define the exact nature of the relations between knowl-
edge, belief, doubt and freedom in history. What we should know however, 
about the context of this last section, is that Climacus underlines the contin-
gency of the historical. Such contingency refers both to the nature of history 
and it signifies the lack of necessary laws pertaining to freedom in the field of 
history and hence to the impossibility of complete historical knowledge.
… [T]here lies here the entire misunderstanding that recurs time and again in 
modern philosophy: to make the eternal historical as a matter of course and to 
assume an ability to comprehend the necessity of the historical. Everything that 
becomes historical is contingent… (CUP, 98)
In the last section of the Interlude Climacus, as we are about to see, ar-
gues that doubt is not the result of ‘less’ knowledge but, instead, it is a matter 
of will. Climacus will argue that the existence of freedom in history results 
at the lack of ‘absolute’ historical cognition. He will continue arguing that 
doubt and belief are responses to this freedom. That is, because we are free 
(in history), we can either choose to doubt or to believe (in history and the 
historical). Freedom and doubt and belief are absolutely interconnected.
Doubt, belief, will and freedom in history
Climacus has already argued that freedom and not necessity exists within 
history. From this ontological claim he has also argued that we cannot know 
history in an absolute manner. Climacus now will conclude his argument 
concerning both his ontological claim and his epistemological one by defin-
ing the exact nature of belief and doubt. He will argue against those who 
claim that doubt results from lack of knowledge and thus ‘more’ knowledge 
can ‘nullify’ doubt.12
Climacus will relate freedom in history with freedom of will and freedom 
of choice. He will explain doubt and belief as direct products of these two 
freedoms and in this way he will conclude his argument in the Interlude.
12 The eighteenth century was the ‘age of enlightenment’, the age of reason. People be-
lieved in the power of reason to clear up any mystery. A further development of this intellec-
tual attitude was the ‘Jesus of history’ debate. People like Friedrich Schleiermacher and David 
Friedrich Strauss argued against the historical accuracy of the Gospels and tried to use reason 
in their effort to explain Bible. Kierkegaard found himself living within this historical/intel-
lectual context and he definitely argued against the importance of reason for faith because he 
believed that he had to defend faith from logic and reason. This is why Kierkegaard tries so 
hard in the ‘Interlude’ to separate belief and reason arguing that belief and faith are products 
of will and not of reason.
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Climacus states twice that ‘immediate sensation and immediate cogni-
tion cannot deceive.’ The problem comes with ‘reflection’ (PF, 81–82). Those 
who think that they can overcome doubt through certain and secure histori-
cal knowledge are mistaken. We have already seen that Climacus argues that 
there is no secure historical knowledge. Now he goes on to state that, if we 
wish to overcome the kind of doubt that comes with reflection, we have to do 
so by means of our will instead of cognition.
That is, Climacus here claims that belief and doubt are acts of freedom, 
expressions of the will, rather than products of cognition and theoretical un-
derstanding: ‘…belief is not knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression 
of will’ (PF, 82–83). Thus, for Climacus, ‘The conclusion of belief is no con-
clusion but a resolution’. The term ‘conclusion’ here refers to a logical proc-
ess, whereas ‘resolution’ consists in an act of will. Hence, Climacus argues 
that belief and doubt are not modes of knowledge, but opposing passions.13 
We are free either to doubt or to believe. We are free to remain skeptical in 
the face of the possible interpretation of the historical facts or we can will to 
believe them. Precisely because every ‘coming into existence’ occurs freely, 
one can never be fully certain about it: historical cognition can never be 
certain. This is why Climacus adds: ‘Belief is a sense for coming into exist-
ence…’ (PF, 84)
It might be argued that there are historical facts known to us without 
any kind of act of will. When a car, for example, crashes into another car, this 
is an indisputable fact; we cannot choose either to believe it or to doubt it. 
Climacus though, does not consider this mere fact of the crash as ‘historical’. 
Instead, for Climacus, a historical fact includes the ‘interpretation’ of this 
fact as well. Questions such as ‘Whose fault is this accident? Is it really a car 
accident or it is a ‘fake’ one for the shooting of a movie?’ are inextricably 
involved here.
Kierkegaard has already asserted, as we have seen, that only human be-
ings can have history, because only human beings can be aware of the active 
connection between their past, their present and their future. Immediate sen-
sation of the bare fact does not constitute a historical fact for Kierkegaard. 
Historical agents need to mediate these mere occurrences through interpre-
tation. Another objection is possible here, however: it might be argued that 
scientific facts of nature also need interpretation, so why can’t one consider 
these as historical facts? Kierkegaard’s answer is that belief and doubt are not 
modes of knowledge. Scientific facts need interpretation but such interpreta-
tion is epistemological. On the other hand, the interpretation of historical 
13 Kierkegaard, PF, 84. ‘Passion’ here does not signify emotion or sensual desire. It refers 
instead to an act of will.
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facts takes place through the will; it is therefore an existential characteristic of 
our historical existence.
The raw immediacy of what happens does not constitute the historical 
fact. Interpretation is needed and yet, Climacus emphasises, such interpreta-
tion will never bring about the kind of knowledge involved in cognition of 
nature. What is more, precisely because history is always the history of hu-
man beings for Climacus, reflection on the intention, motivation and willing 
involved in history is absolutely necessary. This is the reason why for Clima-
cus the ontological question cannot be separated from the epistemological 
one.14
It follows that history requires the active participation of human beings, 
choosing actions, intending actions and willing actions. It is this activity Ki-
erkegaard designates with the term ‘passion’.
In order to pinpoint this active participation in a more precise manner, 
it is worth turning to Roberts’ analysis of the epistemology implicit in the 
Interlude. Roberts reconstructs Climacus’ concepts of belief and doubt as 
follows:
No historical personage (or indeed any event at all) is a flat, straightforward, 
self-interpreting brute datum given to an unambiguous apprehension. Every 
historical judgment, whether made by an eyewitness of the personage in ques-
tion or by someone in a subsequent generation dependent on testimony, 
is shaped ultimately by a set of beliefs held by the individual making the 
judgment, which beliefs form a kind of interpretive mold out of which the 
judgment emerges, and in virtue of which the judgment is certified. (1986: 
126–127)
While there is much to be applauded in this passage, what I dispute in 
Roberts’ interpretation of the Interlude is his contention that it is such epis-
temological issues alone that are at stake. For Roberts, the epistemology laid 
out above is ‘the central insight of Climacus’ Interlude’ (126).
I am claiming that these epistemological issues presuppose initial con-
clusions concerning the ontological nature of history. It is, to repeat, only by 
approaching Climacus’ arguments in the Interlude through both questions 
that its meaning, purpose and function becomes completely clear.
14 Mercer points out that ‘freedom and faith become the elements that are the most 
central to the historical.’ He further argues that “the matter of history is not a metaphysical 
question but an existential question.” Mercer (2000: 138–141). What he is not doing, how-
ever, is to show us how these two Kierkegaardian claims about history and the historical are 
interconnected. 
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Epilogue
If we consider history to be known through the application of general and 
necessary laws, (the way nature can be known), our job as philosophers would 
be much easier. Historical existence would be more certain and secure. If, on 
the other hand, we subscribe to Climacus’ concept of history, then everything 
suddenly becomes insecure and ‘scientific’ accuracy is unavailable to us. Yet, 
we must still attempt on this view to become responsible for the making of 
our history. Of course, this might seem an impossible task; personally each 
one of us may feel too ‘small’ to try to influence history or to try to under-
stand it. But then again, this too fulfills Climacus’ promise: ‘to make difficul-
ties everywhere’ (CUP, 187).
Kierkegaard’s approach to the problem of history and, consequently, his 
philosophical conclusions are original and do deserve our scholarly attention. 
What makes the Kierkegaardian approach to history original is its focus on 
the importance of the future as the main ‘temporal’ dimension of history.
While other philosophers have also pointed out the contingency of his-
tory, (Duns Scotus for example), and while Saint Augustine gave us an analy-
sis of free will similar to the Kierkegaardian one, Kierkegaard redirects the 
historical focus from the past to the future. The main historical tendency is 
completely redirected from the trivial tendency we usually recognize in his-
tory.
We can fully capture the dynamic of the Kierkegaardian approach only 
if we realize that history under his approach becomes the human existential 
need to create a future history and not the scientific need to understand a 
past history. More than that, with Kierkegaard’s approach, history suddenly 
acquires a solid ethical dimension.
Ethical human responsibility in history is the most important implica-
tion of Kierkegaard’s concept of history. If we choose to follow his argumen-
tation, than we cannot any longer view history as an indifferent and neutral 
field within which all that matters is ‘historical facts’.
The Kierkegaardian argumentation offers us, besides an interesting exis-
tential approach to history, a critical and most needed historical element, i.e. 
an ethical criterion to choose what kind of (future) history we need to have. 
We need only to remember what kind of ‘evils’ we, human beings, battled 
during the 20th century to understand the importance of the Kierkegaardian 
approach to history. Because, if we choose to listen to Kierkegaard, history 
has nothing to do with knowing the historical data regarding this battle and 
history becomes our ethical commitment to create our future history in such 
a way that this ‘evil’ will not happen again.
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